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**GENERAL**

**1. Soviet diplomat hints at new approach on Germany:**

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader who has just returned from Moscow, is reported by the Paris newspaper France Soir to have told party leaders that the Soviet Government "is willing to make the widest concessions to prevent West German rearmament at any price."

**SOVIET UNION**

**2. Collective character of new regime stressed by Soviet official:**

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

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[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The power accumulated by Malenkov within the party was probably a more decisive factor affecting Molotov's succession than the latter's age. Recent developments, however, suggest that no one person has yet achieved sufficient power to permit dictatorial control of the Soviet government and party complex.

**FAR EAST**

**3. Peiping seen as reconciled to nonrepatriation of some prisoners:**

[Redacted]

The Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs believes that it would be a mistake to try to force the Chinese Communists to retract their demand for total repatriation of POW's. <sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup>

In his view, the Chinese, while recognizing that many prisoners will remain unwilling to return, are determined to save face by pretending that this is not true. He believes that the Communists, to avoid an appearance of reversing their policy, will probably announce that those who refuse to return are "secret agents of the Kuomintang or the United States."

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

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SECURITY INFORMATION4. Chinese Communists anticipate Nationalist invasion:

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Other recent information concerning mainland defenses suggests a growing Chinese Communist concern over a possible invasion of Fukien.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has stated that the invasion and ultimate political isolation of Fukien Province is within the capability of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. Foreign observers do not agree.

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Iranian Army removes controls in tribal areas:

3.3(h)(2)

On 8 April Iranian Army Chief of Staff Riahi ordered all army installations to withdraw intelligence and security officers from tribal areas because the army no longer has authority over them. Riahi also instructed army units to cooperate fully with local officials of the Ministry of Interior, now responsible for the tribes, and to comply immediately with the Ministry's requests for assistance in maintaining local order.

Comment: Prime Minister Mossadeq ordered disarmament of the tribes stopped on 12 March. Transfer of authority over the tribal areas was announced on 8 April.

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By ending the detested army control, Mossadeq is making a strong bid for the tribes' support. The present step is also in line with his moves to lessen the army's power and prestige, and will encourage further army discontent.

6. Iraq will not renew defense treaty with Britain:



The Iraqi Foreign Minister is reliably reported to have told the parliamentary finance committee on 11 April that the government will allow the Anglo-Iraqi defense treaty to remain in force until its expiration in 1957, but that Iraq will not negotiate a new one. <sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup>

The Foreign Minister also declared that Iraq will sign no agreement which calls for sending an Iraqi army abroad or allowing foreign troops to enter the country.

Comment: Allowing the treaty to run its course is probably the most that the West can expect. Previously, pro-British Defense Minister Nuri Said had declared privately that the treaty needed to be modified; he stated that Iraq would consider a broader defense agreement with the West based on the Arab Collective Security Pact.

Any shift from the present conservative government to a radical one could result in unilateral abrogation of the treaty.

WESTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

7. West German Socialist leader hints at reversal of party's foreign policy:



Chairman Erich Ollenhauer's announcement that Soviet peace overtures should be carefully tested <sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup>

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apparently reversed the party's foreign policy line and reportedly stirred up strong resentment among left-wing Socialist elements. He allegedly stated that central Europe, in view of its inability to establish a strong third-force bloc, must collaborate with the United States to avoid disaster.

These statements run counter to the popular Socialist view that Soviet overtures should be encouraged, particularly those holding a promise of German unity.

Comment: This is the first indication that Ollenhauer is actually taking steps to prepare his followers for the expected shift in the party's foreign policy preliminary to joining Adenauer's Christian Democrats in a new coalition following next summer's elections. His party, however, will probably pursue its negative attitude on EDC, and will be disinclined to examine any Soviet proposals for German unity too carefully until after the elections.

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